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CASE NOTES

CONSUMER LAW-Damages-Treble Damages Are Discretionary
Under the DTPA
Mallory v. Custer,
537 S.W.2d 141 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, no writ).
Custer took his camper for repairs to the defendant, Mallory, who was
listed in the 1974 phone directory as an authorized "Coleman" recreational
vehicle dealer and servicer. Even though Mallory's Camping Center's
affiliation with Coleman ended in 1971, plaintiff was not so informed. The
defendant attempted repair and charged plaintiff $178.50, but the vehicle
still did not function and plaintiff returned it to the Center. When defendant failed to do any additional work, plaintiff took the camper elsewhere to have the repairs completed. The plaintiff sued alleging that the
defendant engaged in false, misleading, or deceptive practices by allowing
confusion as to his association with Coleman-a violation of the Deceptive
Trade Practices--Consumer Protection Act' [DTPA]. The trial court
rendered judgment granting Custer "actual" damages plus treble damages
and five hundred dollars attorneys' fees. Held-Affirmed. Although treble
damages are not mandatory under the DTPA, such judgment is permitted
2
and will not be disturbed.
The court read "may" in the first sentence of section 17.50(b) of the
DTPA as making the granting of the specific remedies enumerated therein
discretionary,8 and there is some support for this position.4 The purposes
for granting punitive damages in consumer cases--encouraging consumers
1. The court entered judgment that the defendant violated TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE
ANNm. § 17.46(b)(5) (Supp. 1976-1977). Since the plaintiff's petition only alleged
violation of § 17.46 of that statute and the defendant did not specially except to
require more definite averments, the judgment was proper.
2. Mallory v. Custer, 537 S.W.2d 141, 143 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, no

writ).

3. Id. at 143.
4. Lynn, A Remedy For Undermade and Oversold Products-The Texas Deceptive
Trade PracticesAct, 7 ST. MARY's L.J. 698, 720 (1976). Criteria from other contexts
were suggested to guide the awarding of treble damages. The court should consider the

deterrent effect on the defendant and on others of imposing a penalty, the need to

compensate the plaintiff for the time he expended litigating, and the encouragement
afforded other potential claimants. Id. at 720-21; see Lightfoot v. MacDonald, 544
P.2d 88, 91 (Wash. 1976) (treble damages discretionary under consumer protection
statute); cf. Brown v. Lyons, 332 N.E.2d 380, 387 (Ohio C.P. Hamilton County 1974)
(punitive damages allowed); State ex rel. Johnson v. International Harvester Co., 548
P.2d 176, 177 (Ore. Ct. App. 1976) (injunction under Unlawful Trade Practices Act
discretionary); Crawford Chevorlet, Inc. v. McLarty, 519 S.W.2d 656, 660 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1975, no writ) (treble damages allowed); O.R. Mitchell Motors, Inc. v.
Bell, 528 S.W.2d 856, 862 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (award
of double time-price differential under Consumer Credit Code).
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with small claims to sue and deterring deceptive and unfair practices 5-may
be realized by either manadtory or discretionary awarding of treble damages.
The statute provides for the issuance of orders necessary to effect restitution, but damages may not be properly awarded pursuant to this provision. 6

"[A]ny other relief which the court deems proper,"' 7 while seemingly an allinclusive proviso, probably should not provide a basis for granting damages.,
It appears that subsection 17.50(b) (1) alone authorizes an award of damages, and since it only allows treble damages, such damages should be deemed
mandatory whenever damages are awarded. 9
Although discretionary damages would undoubtedly be favored by many,
to hold that such was the intent of the legislature would contradict the statute
itself. 10 The possibility that the consumer would not be compensated with
treble damages would dampen his enthusiasm for litigation, and the possibility that the merchant could avoid this liability would encourage him to defend
and continue the practices. This eventuality may thwart the policies behind
the statute and result in less protection for consumers against false, misleading, and deceptive business practices." Any further judicial dilution of the

5. Bragg, Now We're All Consumers! The 1975 Amendments to the Consumer
Protection Act, 28 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 3 (1976); see Lynn, A Remedy For Undermade
and Oversold Products-The Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 7 St. MARY's L.J.
698, 720-21 (1976).
6. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b)(3) (Supp. 1976-1977). This
section provides "orders necessary to restore to any party to the suit any money or
property, real or personal, which may have been acquired in violation of this subchapter."
(emphasis added). This provision contemplates giving restitution rather than the
awarding of damages. These two remedies are clearly distinguishable. Damages are
awarded to put the plaintiff in as good a position as if the contract had been bilaterally
performed, while restitution puts the plaintiff in as good a position as if no contract had
ever been executed. See Coon v. Schoeneman, 476 S.W.2d 439, 441 (Tex. Civ. App.Dallas 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See generally Bourland v. State, 528 S.W.2d 350, 358
(Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (state's right to seek restitution under
§ 17.47(d) of DTPA).
7. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b)(4) (Supp. 1976-1977).
8. Since § 17.50(b)(4) grants any other proper relief including appointing a.
receiver or revoking licenses or other authorizations, damages should not be among the
other remedies or relief granted under this provision. It could be argued that the rule of
ejusdem generis would preclude the granting of any relief under this general provision,
except relief of the same kind or class as the specific remedies included therein. It
should be noted, however, that ejusdem generis is usually applied to statutes with general
words that are preceded by specific enumerations. Stanford v. Butler, 142 Tex. 692, 698,
181 S.W.2d 269, 272 (1944); Goldring v. Goldring, 523 S.W.2d 749, 757 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see Anderson & Kerr Drilling Co. v.
Bruhlmeyer, 134 Tex. 574, 582, 136 S.W.2d 800, 804 (1940) (dictum indicating rule not
applicable in construction of mineral lease where general words precede specific). But
cf. United States v. Gilliland, 312 -U.S. 86, 92 (1941) (rule for interpreting word by its
association with others not applied).
9. See TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b) (Supp. 1976-1977).
10. See id. § 17.44.
11. See Bragg, Now We're All Consumers! The 1975 Amendments to the Consumer
Protection Act, 28 BAYLOR L. Rv. 1, 3 (1976).
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DTPA would be particularly inappropriate in light of the various obstacles
which consumers may encounter in securing any recovery at all. 12 Also, if
treble damages -are to be discretionary, some standards for their award would
be necessary.' 8 The legislature did not make recovery of treble damages
contingent on intent or negligence; in fact, no standards whatsoever' to guide
14
the awarding of such damages were included in the statute.
The statute seems unequivocal on the awarding of "three times the
amount of actual damages,"15 but there is confusion as to the application of
this provision.1 6 In Mallory, the trial court entered judgment for $170.70
7
actual damages, plus $512.10 treble damages for violation of the DTPA.1
The Austin Court of Civil Appeals affirmed -this award without discussion of
the propriety of awarding actual damages.' s Although the additional sum
above the treble damages could be justified as restitution,' 9 the failure to
make this distinction could lead to improper results in other cases. The
amount of the actual damages must be assessed, but only so that the court
may mechanically triple that amount as dictated by the statute.20 In all the
other cases in which treble damages have been awarded pursuant to the
2
DTPA, there has been no award of actual damages. '
The DTPA also provides for the recovery of attorneys' fees, reflecting the
belief that the plaintiff and his attorney should be properly compensated "for
bringing an action that is beneficial not only to the litigant, but to the public
12. See Beam v. Monsanto Co., 532 S.W.2d 175, 182 (Ark. 1976)

(act not

applicable to "vertical competition"); Kohl v. Silver Lake Motors, Inc., 343 N.E.2d 375,
380 (Mass. 1976) (defendant may preclude penalty with reasonable settlement offer);
Neveroski v. Blair, 358 A.2d 473, 479-80 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976) (real estate
not "merchandise" under Consumer Fraud Act); Town & Country Mobile Homes, Inc. v.
Stiles, 543 S.W.2d 664, 666-67 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1976, no writ) (treble damages
award reversed; warranties made and breached before effective date of DTPA); Littleton
v. Woods, 538 S.W.2d 800, 802-03 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, writ granted)
(DTPA not applicable to sale of realty; not in effect at time of sale); Cape Conroe Ltd.
v. Specht, 525 S.W.2d 215, 218-19 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, no
writ) (plaintiff not consumer; warranties made before effective date of DTPA).
13. Bragg, Now We're All Consumers! The 1975 Amendments to the Consumer
Protection Act, 28 BAYLOR L REv. 1, 19 (1976).
14. Id. at 19-21.
15. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b)(1) (Supp. 1976-1977).
16. Mallory v. Custer, 537 S.W.2d 141, 143 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, no

writ).

17. Id. at 143.
18. See id. at 143.
19. See TEx. Bus. &Comm. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b),(3) (Supp. 1976-1977).
20. Id. § 17.50(b)(1); see Bragg, Now We're All Consumers! The 1975 Amendments to the Consumer Protection Act, 28 BAYLOR L. REv. 1, 19-20 (1976).
21. Crawford Chevrolet, Inc. v. McLarty, 519 S.W.2d 656, 660 (Tex. Civ. App.Amarillo 1975, no writ); see Town & Country Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Stiles, 543 S.W.2d
664, 666-67 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1976, no writ) (reversing trial court because
violation occurred before effective date of DTPA); Littleton v. Woods, 538 S.W.2d 800,
802 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, writ granted) (treble damages not allowed
because DTPA not applicable).
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as a whole. 22 Unlike other statutory attorneys' fee provisions that usually
provide for "reasonable" compensation, 23 the DTPA mandates that "attorneys' fees reasonable in relation to the amount of work expended" be
awarded. 24 Basing the granting of attorneys' fees on effort expended, rather
than merely on the amount of the plaintiff's recovery, will encourage
thorough and expert preparation of cases and will also provide attorneys who
would otherwise hesitate to litigate in this field more incentive to do so. One
commentator, however, foresees the possibility that this criterion could make
single claimant's suits more attractive than large class actions, unless the
court could, within its discretion, base the attorneys' fees in such suits on a
25
percentage of the recovery.
Although the granting of some attorneys' fees is mandatory in a proper
case, 26 the actual amount of such fees is discretionary with the qualification

that they be based on the attorneys' efforts. 27 In cases in which treble
damages were allowed, attorneys' fees were also granted, and none of these
awards have been reversed. 28 The trial court's award of attorneys' fees for
appeal of the case, with payment made contingent on appeal actually being
taken, is also proper because this work is as essential to securing recovery as
is the work on the trial itself. 29 By the same reasoning, a claimant under
22. Lynn, A Remedy For Undermade and Oversold Products-The Texas Decpetive
Trade Practices Act, 7 ST. MARY'S L.J. 698, 721 (1976). The granting of attorneys'
fees, in addition to treble damages, ensures that attorneys are compensated while still
providing adequate recompense for the plaintiff above any actual loss he may have
incurred. This result will maintain the desired impetus for plaintiffs with small claims to
sue and for competent attorneys to represent them. See id. at 721-22.
23. See, e.g., TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.62 (1963); TEX. REv. CiV. STAT. ANN. art.
2226 (Supp. 1976-1977); id. art. 5236e, § 4(a), (b).
24. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b)(1) (Supp. 1976-1977).
25. Lynn, A Remedy For Undermade and Oversold Products-The Texas Deceptive
Trade PracticesAct, 7 ST. MARY'S L.J. 698, 721-22 (1976).
26. The considerations that compel mandatory treble damages also apply to the
awarding of attorneys' fees. See notes 5-14 supra and accompanying text.
27. See TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b)(1) (Supp. 1976-1977).
28. Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Licht, 544 S.W.2d 442, 446 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1976, no writ) (fees for appeal as well as trial); Mallory v. Custer, 537 S.W.2d
141, 143 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, no writ) ($500 for trial); Crawford Chevrolet,
Inc. v. McLarty, 519 S.W.2d 656, 660 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1975, no writ) ($500
for trial). There has been no challenge for abuse of discretion or on any other grounds
specifically levied against the award of attorneys' fees in these cases. A case in which
treble damages and attorneys' fees were granted by the trial court was reversed on
appeal, but only because relief under § 17.50 of the DTPA was improper. Town &
Country Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Stiles, 543 S.W.2d 664, 666 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1976, no writ) ($5,000 attorneys' fees for trial).
29. Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Licht, 544 S.W.2d 442, 446 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1976, no writ) ($500 for appeal to court of civil appeals, $50 if no writ, $750 if
writ granted). In Licht the court relied on Security Life Ins. Co. v. Spray, 468 S.W.2d
347 (Tex. 1971), which upheld the trial court's award of attorney's fees for appeal in
a suit under the Insurance Code which allowed recovery of "reasonable attorney fees
for the prosecution and collection of such loss." 544 S.W.2d at 446.
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